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Bill 10, if Enacted, Will Install a Constitutional Dictatorship and Undermine
Democracy in Zambia

Muna Ndulo
(William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and Comparative Law, Cornell Law
School)

Zambia has made several attempts to elaborate a democratic constitution that promotes good
governance, inclusiveness, citizen participation, accountability, and the separation of powers
between the three arms of government-parliament, the judiciary, and the executive. Success has been
elusive largely because the processes used have been inappropriate for consensus building. The
latest attempt, the Constitution Amendment Bill No. 10 of 2019, which came out of a ruling party
dominated constitutional conference, is presently before parliament. The constitutional conference
excluded key stake holders such as the main opposition party and civil society. The paper critically
examines the contents of Bill 10 and its constitutionality. It argues that Bill 10 removes parliamentary
oversight over the executive and aims to create a constitutional dictatorship. The paper further
argues that Bill 10 is unconstitutional as it seeks to alter the basic structure of the 2016 Zambian
constitution. The fundamental basic structure of the 2016 constitution is the separation of powers
between the three arms of government-parliament, the judiciary, and the executive. The paper argues
that while parliament has wide powers to amend the constitution, that power does not include the
power to destroy or emasculate the basic structure or fundamental features of the constitution.

1. Introduction
Most independent African constitutions, crafted by departing colonial powers, overcentralised power in the presidency to the detriment of governance and development
without adequate checks and balances. With the advent of the world wide movement
towards democratisation in Africa and elsewhere, the post-1998 constitution-making
processes focus on promoting democratisation and participation in governance,
institutionalising accountability, and establishing checks and balances in constitutional
arrangements (Hatchard, 2004). This requires devising governmental arrangements that are
meant to do away with old colonial undemocratic constitutional practices. Examples of
successful constitutional processes include Benin, Namibia, South Africa, and Kenya while
Tanzania and Zambia represent failed processes (Miller, 2010). The interrelationship
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between good governance and development is widely recognised throughout the world.
Without good governance, there can be no meaningful development (Ndulo, 2003).
After several attempts, Zambia has failed to develop a democratic constitution which
ensures that its citizens fully participate in the governance of the state and that those in
power are accountable to the people that elected them (Ndulo, 2019). This is because the
processes adopted to develop a new constitution have been deeply flawed. In all the previous
efforts, including the current one, there has been an attempt by the ruling party to
manipulate the process and use it to achieve its own goals. The processes have been
dominated by the ruling party, lack any philosophical approach to constitution making and
are not guided by any constitutional principles. For a constitution-making process to be
successful, it must be inclusive. That is, it must be representative of the people of the country,
i.e. it must include all stakeholders. In constitution-making undertakings, the process is as
important as the substance (Miller, 2010).
In 2019 the Patriotic Front (PF), the ruling party in Zambia, initiated a process to
implement major amendments to the 2016 constitution on the pretext of addressing lacunas
in the constitution. The process has culminated in the introduction in Parliament of the 2019
Constitution Amendment Bill No. 10 of 2019. The process that led to Bill 10 was deeply
flawed. It was unrepresentative and was boycotted by several opposition parties including
the main opposition party, United Party for National Development (UPND). In this article, it
is argued that Bill 10 is manipulative and attempts to deceive the people of Zambia and create
a dictatorship under the guise of constitutional reform. It is a ploy to seek legitimacy for the
adoption of radical constitutional reforms aimed at destroying the basic structure of the
2016 Zambian constitution. Bill 10 is designed to remove parliamentary oversight over the
presidency and thereby install a constitutional dictatorship. It attempts to manipulate the
electoral system to ensure that the ruling party remains in power in perpetuity. Additionally,
it is argued that Bill 10 is unconstitutional as it undermines the basic structure of the
constitution based on the doctrine of the separations of powers. In a constitutional
democracy, parliamentary power to legislate is not unlimited. It is given by the constitution
and therefore subject to the constitution and it certainly does not include the power to
subvert the constitution.
The article is organised into three sections. The first section examines the role of the
constitution in a democratic society. The second section critically examines the proposed
amendments and the third section examines the constitutionality of the proposed
amendments in the context of the constitutional principle of the basic structure doctrine
developed by the Indian Supreme Court and adopted in several other jurisdictions.
2. Constitution and the Rule of Law
The constitution of any state is a body of fundamental principles that constitute the legal
basis on which a state is governed. It determines the powers and duties of the government
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and guarantees certain rights to the people. It is the highest organising document of the state.
It provides the cornerstone and framework upon which the edifice of the state is created. It
is the basic law – the grundnorm – and as such the source of legitimate conferral of state
powers and their exercise. As the Constitutional Court observed in its recent decision
involving the Speaker of the National Assembly, all institutions and the high offices created
by the constitution are themselves subservient to the constitution. All institutions and
governance systems owe their being to the constitution and the powers conferred on them
can only be exercised in line with the constitution (Kambwili v. Attorney General, 2019).
The constitution has a basic structure, and the separation of powers doctrine is a
fundamental norm of the structure. It should be understood as part of the institutional
balance between coordinate branches of government. The constitution is therefore a
document of special character – subject only to the ultimate will of the people and not to the
whimsical accumulation of powers and privileges of any individual. It is important to
emphasise the point that the constitution is supreme over all institutions, including the
parliament and the judiciary. That is what is meant by the concept of constitutionalism and
the rule of law.
3. What is Wrong with the Proposed Amendments?
The objects of Bill 10 would seem innocuous to an untrained eye. But this is a deeply
manipulative document that seeks to establish a constitutional dictatorship in Zambia. This
should startle anybody who deeply cares about constitutionalism and democratic
governance in Zambia. In this section the paper draws attention to some salient and farreaching changes inherent in the proposed amendments. It is hoped that the discussion on
the amendments will demonstrate that this effort has structure, purpose, and strategy
behind it, which is to neutralise all levers of checks and install an unaccountable executive.

3.1 Amendments too Broad
There are numerous amendments – dealing with almost every aspect of state powers and
public life in the country. It pertains not only to the principles and values of the Constitution
of Zambia, but also deals with the National Assembly including its membership, dissolution,
the period of hearing, determination of the hearing of presidential election petitions,
creation of office of deputy minister, functions of public protector and banking and the
Auditor General. Moreover, there is an omnibus clause which provides for the enactment of
legislation and statutory instruments: “for matters connected with, or incidental to, the
foregoing.” (See paragraph “p” of the AGs proposal attached to the bill as introduced in
parliament.)
The proposed amendments are too broad and overreaching. Zambians might as well
look for a new constitution instead of these broad sweeping amendments with no direct
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gains for democracy. To really have a meaningful deliberation on all these provisions is
doubtful, thus it is fair to assume that the government wants to sneak in changes to the
constitution without the possibility of thorough examination. This may well explain the
conflation of all manner of issues including banking and fiscal policy into this proposed
amendment.

3.2 Time and Timing
It is apparent that the time and timing of this amendment is rather suspect. Elections are just
around the corner and the attempt to hurry through some fundamental amendments to the
electoral process is suspicious to put it mildly. It would seem that the aim is rather parochial.
To avoid this possibility, issues that involve qualification and disqualification for
participating at any level of the electoral process should not be hurriedly passed as a
constitutional amendment.

3.3 Removal of President on Grounds of Incapacity
The instant provision in Article 107 of the Constitution of Zambia provides that: “107 (1) A
Member of Parliament, supported by at least one third of the Members of Parliament, may
move a motion for the investigation of the physical or mental capacity of the President to
perform executive functions.” (Emphasis supplied).
The proposed amendment says “Article 107 of the Constitution is amended by the
deletion of the words “physical or mental” wherever the words appear.” (See Article 31, lines
5-9 of the proposed Amendment, emphasis supplied). Zambians may well ask: what is the
essence of stopping parliament from enquiring into the physical or mental health of the
president even if such a president can no longer perform the duties of the high office of the
president of Zambia? One thing is clear here, the present government and her coterie are

envisaging a Zambia where even a vegetative president would not and cannot be removed
from office since parliament cannot inquire into the health status of such a president. This
applies mutatis mutandis to the Vice President as well. This is dangerous for democracy
because nobody in the land and no organ of the state can investigate the health of the two
principal officers of the state—the president and his or her vice.

3.4 Impeachment of the President/Vice-President
The extant provision in the Constitution of Zambia regarding impeachment of the president
is as contained in Article 108. Article 108. (1) provides that “A Member of Parliament,
supported by at least one third of the Members of Parliament, may move a motion for the
impeachment of the President alleging that the President has committed – (a) a violation of
a provision of this Constitution or other law; (b) a crime under international law; or (c) gross
34
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misconduct. (2) The motion, moved in accordance with clause (1), shall specify the
particulars of the allegation. (3) Where a motion, moved in accordance with clause (1), is
supported, in the National Assembly, by a resolution of two-thirds of the Members of
Parliament – (a) the Speaker shall, within forty-eight hours of the adoption of the resolution,
inform the Chief Justice of the resolution; and (b) the Chief Justice shall immediately inform
the President of the resolution, whereupon the President shall cease to perform the
executive functions and the Vice President shall perform the executive functions, except the
power to – (i) make an appointment; or (ii) dissolve the National Assembly. (4) The Chief
Justice shall, within seven days of being informed of the resolution of the National Assembly,
appoint a tribunal, in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, which shall consist
of a chairperson and not less than two other members from among persons who hold, have
held or qualify to hold, the office of judge. (5) The tribunal appointed under clause (4) shall,
within thirty days of its appointment – (a) investigate the matter relating to the
impeachment of the President; and (b) report to the Chief Justice as to whether or not the
particulars of the allegations specified in the motion have been substantiated.”
Under Article 108 (6), The President has the right to appear and be represented
before the tribunal during its investigation. (7) The Chief Justice shall, on receipt of the
report referred to in clause (5) (b), immediately submit the report to the National Assembly.
(8) Where the tribunal reports that the particulars of an allegation against the President –
(a) is not substantiated, the National Assembly shall, on a motion supported by the votes of
not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament, taken by secret ballot, resolve that –
(i) the President did not commit the violations specified in the motion; and (ii) further
proceedings shall not be taken with respect to the allegation; or (b) is substantiated, the
National Assembly shall, on a motion supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of
the Members of Parliament, taken by secret ballot, resolve that the President has committed
the violations specified in the motion and that the President should cease to hold office
forthwith. (emphasis supplied). (9) The President shall, on the passing of a resolution in
accordance with— (a) clause (7) (a), resume to perform the executive functions; or (b)
clause (7) (b), cease to hold office and be amenable to prosecution without the need to lift
the immunity under Article 98. (10) Where a motion is moved in accordance with clause (1),
the President shall not dissolve Parliament. (11) This Article applies to the Vice-President.”
(Impeachment of President Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) (No. 2 of 2016 47)).
The provision above by itself is tedious because, it is not easy to muster the number
of parliamentarians required to impeach a president, it is therefore generally fair since it
provides for many measures to guarantee fairness to any occupant of the office of President
or Vice- President. The now proposed amendment seeks to make it impossible to even
contemplate impeaching the president or vice president. Hence, it has whittled down the
capacity of the constitution to check the powers of the Presidency or seek accountability
from any occupier of that high office. Note particularly clause 7, 8(a) and 9 of Article 108 as
they are very significant to the proposed amendment.
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For the avoidance of doubt the proposed amendments states “Article 108 of the
Constitution is amended by the deletion of – (a) clause (8)(a) and the substitution therefor
of the following: (a) is not substantiated, the National Assembly shall not take further
proceedings in respect of the allegation; or; and (b) by the deletion of clause (9) and the
substitution therefor of the following: (9) The President shall, on the passing of the
resolution in accordance with – (a) clause (8)(a), resume to perform the executive functions;
or (b) clause (8)(b), cease to hold office and be amenable to prosecution without the need
to lift the immunity under Article 98. ((emphasis supplied) see Article 32 (paragraph 10-24)
of proposed amendment).
What this provision does is to remove the capacity of parliament to vote by secret
ballot to resolve whether the findings of a tribunal brought before parliament substantiates
the allegations against the president or otherwise. The legislative intention in the existing
law is that parliament should have the final say via secret ballot as to whether the findings
have made out the allegation or not. To remove this power is to make it possible for findings
of a tribunal to have the air of finality. It removes the capacity of the peoples’ representative
– the parliament to ratify or vary the outcome of such tribunals. I need not say how much
this consolidates powers in the hands of the president and also puts pressure on any
committee or tribunal that might be asked to investigate allegations of misconduct. Indeed,
the president can manipulate, or intimidate both the constitution and findings of such a
tribunal. Additionally, the members of parliament would no longer be protected from
retaliation as the secret ballot is removed.

3.5 Tenure of Office of Vice-President and Vacancy
The conspiracy inherent in this proposed amendment is further highlighted in the
examination of the proposed amendments regarding tenure of office and the vacancy in the
office of president and vice-president respectively. Like the Catiline Conspiracy, there is an
attempt by the ruling oligarchy to steal, expropriate, and personalise the high offices of the
President and Vice-President of Zambia.
The existing Constitutional Provision in Article 111 states: “111. (1) The term of office
for a Vice-President is five years. (2) A Vice-President shall hold office from the date the Vicepresident-elect is sworn into office and ending on the date the next President-elect is sworn
into office. (3) A person who has twice held the office of Vice-President shall not be selected
as a running mate. (4) The office of Vice-President becomes vacant if the Vice-president – (a)
dies; (b) resigns by notice in writing to the President; (c) otherwise ceases to hold office
under Article 81,107 or 108; or (d) assumes the office of President. (5) Where a vacancy
occurs in the office of Vice-President, except as provided under Article 81, the President shall
appoint another person to be Vice-President and the National Assembly shall, by a resolution
supported by the votes of not less than two thirds of the Members of Parliament, approve
the appointment of that person as Vice-President. (6) The person who assumes office as
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Vice-President, in accordance with clause (5), shall serve for the unexpired term of office and
be deemed for the purposes of clause (3) – (a) to have served a full term as Vice-President
if, at the date on which the Vice-President assumed office, more than three years remain
before the date of the next general election; or (b) not to have served a term of office as VicePresident if, at the date on which the Vice-President assumed office, less than three years
remain before the date of the next general elections.” (emphasis supplied).
The proposed amendment states “Article 111 of the Constitution is amended – (a) by
the deletion of clauses (3) and (6); and (b) by the renumbering of clauses (4) and (5) as
clauses (3) and (4), respectively” (See Article 33 of proposed Amendment).
Tragically, this proposed amendment seeks to eliminate tenure limits because the
person who assumes office as Vice President will no longer be serving the unexpired term of
office. Equally, a person who has served twice as Vice-President will no longer be disqualified
from serving a third, fourth, fifth, or infinite term as Vice-President. The ramifications of this
for multi-party democracy and public accountability are totally unbelievable. Is this in the
public interest? Why all these sweeping appropriations and consolidation of powers in the
presidency? Zambia aspires to consolidate democracy and not to install a dictatorship.

3.6 Functions of the Vice-President
As provided in Article 112 (1) of the Zambian Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
answerable to the President in the Performance of the functions of Vice-President. “(2) The
Vice-President shall – (a) perform the functions that are assigned to the Vice-President by
the President; (b) perform the executive functions during the periods specified in this
Constitution; and (c) assume the office of President as specified in Article 106 (5).” Bill 10
proposes that “The Constitution is amended by deletion of the subheading immediately after
Article 112 and the substitution therefor of the following: “Cabinet, Minister, Provincial
Minister and Deputy Minister”” (See article 34 – repeal and replacement of Article 112).
In effect, this provision renders the office of the Vice-President powerless and makes
the occupant a mere puppet of the president. The Vice-President cannot take steps on behalf
of the state or perform the duties of the president even in the president’s absence. This can
be very dangerous in case of sudden death, impeachment or other human misfortune against
the occupant of the office of the president – especially if that person is incapacitated by
mental or bodily infirmity to perform the duties of that office. The political uncertainty which
this might engender in a complex society like Zambia is unfathomable. Note that Article 106
of the Constitution of Zambia provides that “the term of office for a President is five years
which shall run concurrently with the term of Parliament, except that the term of office of
President shall expire when the President-elect assumes office in accordance with Article

105.”
More so, Article 106(5) provides that “When a vacancy occurs in the office of
President, except under Article 81 – (a) the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
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office of President; or (b) if the Vice-President is unable for a reason to assume the office of
President, the Speaker shall perform the executive functions, except the power to – (i) make
an appointment; or (ii) dissolve the National Assembly; and a presidential election shall be
held within sixty days after the occurrence of the vacancy.” A careful and combined reading
of the juxtaposed provisions directly above reveals the uncanny intentions of the proponents
of Bill 10. If this provision goes through successfully what it means is that we would have
effectively turned Zambia into a serfdom; the private estate of the president and his coterie
of courtiers. It will endanger the peace and prosperity of Zambia.

3.7 Mental and Physical Capacity of Ministers
Article 116 (3) (f) of the Constitution of Zambia is of the intendment that the office of a
minister can become vacant by reason of the fact that “the Minister has a mental or physical
disability that makes the Minister incapable of performing the functions of that office.” Now
Article 116 (3) of the Constitution is amended – (a) by the deletion of paragraph (f) and the
substitution therefor of the following: (f) the Minister is legally disqualified from performing
the functions of that office...”
One is left wondering why the present administration seeks to legislate against health
issues which are often beyond human control. If a minister by any stroke of fate loses mental
or physical capacity to perform the functions of his/her office, is she/he expected to stay in
office in perpetuity to the detriment of the Zambian state? It is beyond telling how the ardor
of power and privilege can close the human mind to the fragility, frailty, and decay of human
nature with time. This passionate embrace of power is an ill wind and Zambia cannot afford
it at this period of her development.

3.8 Appointment of Deputy Ministers
Article 117 is amended to provide for the appointment of Deputy Ministers. The proposed
amendment states “The Constitution is amended by the insertion of the following new Article
immediately after Article 117: 117A. The President may appoint a prescribed number of
Deputy Ministers as the President may consider necessary to assist Ministers in the
performance of the Ministers functions and to exercise or to perform on behalf of Ministers
functions of the Ministers that the President may authorize in that behalf.”
Zambia is a poor state, thus the wisdom of enlarging the number of individuals who
will be dependent on the state for their daily sustenance is doubtful. Putting it mildly, this
seems like an opportunity to create jobs for political disciples who insult critics of the
Government. Zambia’s limited resources need to be better invested towards the economic
and social emancipation of the people. The hazardous health facilities, the poorly funded
universities, and schools in general could do better with the resources that would be
misdirected towards financing these acolytes of the president.
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3.9 Parliamentary Oversight of Public Debt and Creation of Provinces
Bill 10 repeals article 62(2) (d) &(e) of the constitution which states that: (a) the National
Assembly shall oversee the performance of executive functions; (b) Public debt before it is
contracted; (approve Guarantees on loans contracted by the state institutions or other
institutions) (c) Approving International Agreements and Treaties before these are acceded
to or ratified. Instead the amendment provides that: “Cabinet shall accede or ratify or
withdraw from international agreements and approve loans contracted by the state and
guarantees on loans contracted by state institutions.” Parliamentary oversight is removed.
Given Zambia’s debt crisis which is due to irresponsible borrowing, the removal of
parliamentary oversight is incomprehensible.
A further proposed amendment which relates to National Assembly oversight, is
Article 149 (1) which currently states that the president may, subject to the approval of the
National Assembly create or divide a province or merge two or more provinces as
prescribed. In the proposed amendment the phrase “subject to the approval of the National
Assembly”, is removed and the President under Bill 10 will be able to create provinces
without any parliamentary or other oversight.

3.10 International Agreements
The proposed amendments repeal article 63 (2) (e) which currently gives the National
Assembly oversight over approving international agreements and treaties before these are
acceded to or ratified. Article 92 (2) (c) explains that the President has the power to
negotiate and sign international agreements and the proposed amendment removes the
requirement that his or her power be subject to approval by the National Assembly.

3.11 National Assembly Oversight over Appointments Made by the Executive
A proposed amendment of Article 94 of the Constitution also reduces the power of the
National Assembly to effectively exercise oversight over appointments or measures taken by
the President. The proposed amendments will allow the executive to act without seeking
approval of the National Assembly. This is a deliberate attempt to remove parliamentary
oversight on this important area. With the amendment, where the National Assembly rejects
the appointment for the third time that measure or appointment shall take effect.

3.12 Disciplinary Actions against Judges and the Judiciary
International and regional standards establish that judges may only be dismissed on serious
grounds of misconduct or incompetence, in accordance with fair procedures ensuring
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objectivity and impartiality set out in the constitution. To ensure the independence of the
judiciary, such disciplinary proceedings must be held by an institution independent of the
executive. The current Article 143(a) provides that a judge may be removed from office on
the following grounds: (a) mental or physical disability that makes the judge incapable of
performing judicial functions; (b) incompetence; (c) gross misconduct; or (d) bankruptcy.
The amendment Bill replaces “mental or physical disability that makes the judge incapable
of performing judicial function”, with “legally disqualified from performing judicial function.”
What does “legally disqualified” in this context mean? The provision is vague. It exists in no
other constitution in the world. The vagueness of the provision increases the risk of judges
being removed on politically motivated grounds and threatens the rule of law and separation
of powers.
This development comes in combination with a proposed amendment to Article 114
transferring the ultimate decision to remove a judge from the judicial Complaints
Commission to a Tribunal Appointed by the President (new article 44 (3)). Regarding the
Constitutional Court, the amendment removes the positions of the President and Deputy
President without clearly specifying where the powers of the two are to rest in their absence.
In addition, the requirement of a sitting bench of at least 11 judges on the Supreme Court
and constitutional court is replaced with the vague notion of simply requiring “an even
number of judges, as prescribed.” This opens up an avenue through which the judiciary could
be manipulated by the executive. To avoid the possibility of such an outcome, the number of
judges in the highest courts should be “rigid” and should not be subject to change except
through legislation. This is particularly important as an independent judiciary is
indispensable to constitutional democracy.

3.13 Amendments Relating to Elections
Article 81 (3) provides that the President may dissolve parliament if the Executive cannot
effectively govern the Republic of Zambia due to the failure of the National Assembly to
objectively and reasonably carry out its legislative function. This is a most unusual provision
and clearly sends the message that the Executive is superior to Parliament. How can the
executive be the determinant as to whether parliament is performing its duties or not? What
does “reasonable” in this context mean? This provision erodes the independence of
parliament. The only control, in the exercise of this power, by the president is that he or she
shall inform the public and refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for review.
In Article 9, Bill 10 provides that the constitution is amended to repeal Article 51 and
the substitution thereof of the following: (2) Elections to the National Assembly shall be
conducted under a mixed member electoral system as prescribed. This is an attempt to
introduce proportional representation. No details are given as to how this complicated
system of elections is going to be implemented. Countries that have proportional
representation have detailed provisions in the constitution as to how lists of candidates are
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to be made and the threshold for getting a seat. Article 9, gives the impression of an
inadequately thought out provision.
Bill 10 proposes to amend the constitution by repealing the current Article 68 and the
substitution of the following: “subject to Article 47, the election, nomination, qualification
and vacation of office of a Member of Parliament shall be as prescribed.” These are matters
which are so fundamental to constitutional democracy that they should be dealt with in the
constitution. The qualifications for election to parliament and the presidency are important
constitutional questions. They are never left to parliament to decide. It is quite clear that the
intention of Bill 10 is to give the ruling party the power to determine who can stand for
President and parliament. By leaving election matters to Parliament, they also seek to
redraw the electoral map of Zambia so that constituencies are increased in areas where the
ruling party has majority voters, thereby ensuring a permanent majority in parliament. This
fits into the overall objective of Bill 10 to constitutionalise dictatorship and ensure the ruling
party rule in perpetuity.
A further Amendment in Bill 10 states that “Article 116 (3) is amended so that a
Minister will continue to hold office until the next general election.” This is clearly a reaction
to the Constitutional Court judgment that held that Ministers who continued to hold on to
office in the last election, violated the constitution and must pay back all emoluments earned
during that period. This is clearly so that Ministers can use government resources to
campaign for elections in the 2021 elections.

3.14 Coalition Government
Bill 10 proposes to introduce a coalition form of government to govern the country in
situations provided by Bill 10. It provides that: “The candidate with the highest votes cast
shall, within fourteen days of the declaration by the Returning Officer of the Presidential
election results negotiate and form a coalition government with a presidential candidate that
participated in the initial ballot, except that the combined votes of that presidential
candidate and the preferred candidate forming the coalition government meet the threshold
of more than fifty percent of the valid votes cast.” The first observation to be made is that
this sort of provision does not exist anywhere else in the world. Presidential candidates
stand as individual candidates. Their votes cannot be transferred to another candidate at the
behest of another candidate. The provision is ill conceived and is designed to undermine
democratic elections. In presidential elections, citizens vote for an individual, not the party.
The amendment does not deal with the issue of the Vice President, who under the
constitution is a running mate. So, which of the running mates of the two presidential
candidates gets to be Vice President?
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4. Basic Structure Doctrine and Constitutional Amendments
In conclusion, the paper argues that the proposed amendments are unconstitutional and
violate the basic structure of the constitution. Most of the amendments contained in Bill 10
are about removing parliamentary oversight over the executive and subjecting the judiciary
to executive control, thereby seeking to alter the basic structure of the 2016 Zambian
constitution and completely missing the objectives of the post 1998 constitutional project in
Zambia. In addition, the reduction of Parliament’s powers goes against Article 27 of the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which states that “in order to
advance political, economic and social governance, state parties shall commit themselves to
strengthening the capacity of parliaments and legally recognized political parties to perform
their core functions.” (2007)
The basic structure doctrine is a constitutional principle developed by the Indian
Supreme Court and now followed in many parts of the world. It proceeds on the basis that a
constitution has basic features that cannot be altered through amendment by parliament. It
was first elaborated in 1964 by Justice J.R. Mudhoikar in his dissent in Sajjan Sigh v. State of
Rajasthan (1964). The basic structure of the 2016 Zambian constitution are the following
principles: (a) supremacy of parliament; (b) republican and democratic form of government;
(c) secular part of the constitution and (d) the separation of powers between the legislature,
executive, and the judiciary.
In 1973 the basic structure doctrine triumphed in Justice Han’s Khanna’s judgment in
the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) which held: “While
Parliament has wide powers to amend the constitution, it did not have the power to destroy
or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental features of the constitution.” Subsequent
cases have upheld the doctrine. See Indira Nehru Ghandi v. Rajnarain (1975). The basic
structure doctrine has been adopted in Bangladesh, Anwar Hussain v. Chowdharay (1989).
The article will end its discussion with a highly relevant quote from Nelson Mandela (1994)
who I believe is the greatest democrat the world has ever seen. He said: “People come and
Go. Customs, fashions and preferences change. Yet the web of fundamental rights and justice
which a nation proclaims, must not be broken. It is the task of the court to ensure that the
values of freedom and equality which underlie the Constitution are nurtured and protected
so that they may endure. Constitutionalism means that no office and no institution can be
higher that the law. The highest and the most humble in the land all, without exception, owe
allegiance to the same document, the same principles. The authority of government comes
from the people through the constitution. The people speak through the constitution.”
Bill 10 is about reducing parliamentary oversight over the Presidency. It is about
rendering the checks and balances and the other branches of government powerless. It is a
stealth attempt to privatise the Zambian nation through the office of the Executive. This
attempt has no redeeming feature because it is prima facie mala fides (in bad faith). The
Constitution of Zambia has noted imperfections, but any attempt to amend it, should be in
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the overall interest of democracy, justice, peace, accountability, and fundamental freedoms.
To tinker it in order to expropriate the state or create a “democratic dictatorship” cannot be
in the best interest of our beloved country. “History could not be any clearer: Rights given by
fad and fashion are just as easily taken away. The Constitution matters” (Samaan).
References

Cases
Anwar Hussain v. Chowdharay, 1989 18 CLC (AD)
Chishimba Kambwili v. Attorney-General, 2019/CCZ/009
Ghandi v. Rajnarain, 1975 AIR 865, 1995 SCR (3) 333
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,1973 4SCC 225:AIR 1973 SC 1461
Sajjan Sigh v State of Rajasthan, 1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR(1) 933

Bibliography
“African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.” 2007. Adopted by the Eighth
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads State and Government, Held in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, 20 January 2007.
Hatchard, M. Ndulo & P. Slinn. 2004. Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance
in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Miller L. ed. 2010. Framing the State in Times of Transition Case Studies in Constitution
Making. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Ndulo, M. 2003. “The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in Africa.” Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies. 10 (1).
https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/nelson-mandela-famous-quotes
https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/7213330.A_E_Samaan

43

